AMERICAN POLITICS & PUBLIC POLICY WORKSHOP
Abstract: Both electoral competition within jurisdictions and geographical competition between them are capable of forcing political representatives to act in the interest of voters. How do these forms of competition interact to affect the quality of governance? We develop a formal model to investigate this question. The model posits that local officials provide governance quality to compete for residents against other jurisdictions, and for votes against other candidates in their jurisdiction. Further, some voters are moderates: they value governance quality but not partisanship of officials. Others are partisans: they value both governance quality and the partisanship of officials. The analysis reveals that geographical and electoral competition can interact to undermine the quality of governance. When partisan polarization is high, representatives can shape their electorate in their favor by governing poorly. Moderate voters leave their jurisdiction and strongly partisan voters remain, which promotes electoral security of incumbent politicians.
Sean Gailmard is the Herman Royer Professor of Political Economy at the University of California, Berkeley. His research explores how American political institutions operate, change, and affect governance quality. His work focuses particularly on the US executive branch, checks and balances across branches of government, bureaucratic capacity, and the evolution of US institutions. His most recent book, Agents of Empire: English Imperial Governance and the Making of American Political Institutions (Cambridge University Press, 2024) explores the strategic workings of English colonial governance and their effects on American institutional development.
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