

# How Does Childhood Environment Shape Political Participation? Evidence from Refugees

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## Abstract

Where do the political behaviors and preferences of refugees come from? We compile a novel database of over 600,000 U.S. immigration records largely for refugees fleeing socialist dictatorships and link these records to national voter files. We show that an immigrant's origin country influences voting behavior and partisan preferences. Using a between-siblings design, we find that each additional year of time spent in the origin country is associated with an increased likelihood of voting in midterm (2.3%) and presidential elections (0.8%), as well as an increased likelihood of registering as a Republican in adulthood (2.2%). A Facebook survey of a comparable population reveals that immigrants who arrive in the U.S. at older ages look less like ideological partisans than people who arrive at younger ages. We propose four hypotheses for why more time in the origin country can manifest as increased civic engagement and conservatism once in the U.S.

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# 1 Introduction

How does the political context in an immigrant’s home country affect her political affiliations and behavior in her adopted country? The stakes of this question have increased in recent decades. As of 2020, more than 85 million Americans could be described as immigrants or the U.S.-born children of immigrants ([Census, 2020](#)). Pew Research Center estimates that in the 2020 presidential election one-in-ten eligible voters were naturalized immigrant-citizens – a number that has more than doubled since 2000 ([Budiman, Noe-Bustamante and Lopez, 2020](#)). Additionally, while recent work has suggested that moving to a better environment in childhood leads to greater economic prosperity in adulthood (e.g. [Chetty and Hendren, 2018](#)), little work has been done to understand how age at move and place of origin shape political behavior in adulthood.

How age at move and place of origin matter for immigrant political behavior has proven difficult to study ([Cantoni and Pons, 2022](#)). On the one hand, there are challenges in basic data collection. Targeting immigrant populations via surveys poses significant challenges and administrative records on immigrants are almost impossible for researchers to access. To the extent that studies do reach immigrants, they often rely on surveys or census micro-data that combines “new arrivals” with earlier arrivals and is not individually-identified ([Abramitzky, Baseler and Sin, 2022](#)). On the other hand, even assuming one finds data on this increasingly important population, making well-identified inferences about what drives political attitudes and behaviors can similarly prove prohibitively difficult. Suppose one finds a relationship between immigration status and behavior or preferences. It is hard to discount the possibility that differences in behavior or preferences are themselves the factors causing people to immigrate in the first place ([Turcu and Urbatsch, 2022](#); [Lim, 2022](#)). With a few recent exceptions (e.g. [Superti and Gidron, 2021](#); [Charnysh and Peisakhin, 2022](#)), there has been limited work that convincingly shows whether, how, and why experience in country of origin influences political behavior or attitudes in the destination country.

To give these questions a concrete context, consider first the experience of Cuban Americans and second the experience of immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Cuban-

Americans have substantially more conservative preferences than immigrants from elsewhere in Latin-America: 58% of Cuban-Americans are registered Republicans, while Non-Cuban Hispanic-American voters lean Democrat by a margin of 65% (Krogstad, 2020). Press accounts often explain Cuban-Americans' Republican leanings as a result of experiencing Castro's nationalization of private enterprise, suspension of democratic processes, and disruption of the free press. Yet one could also reasonably suppose that individuals who were more religious or supportive of free-enterprise would have significantly greater interest in leaving communist Cuba. These same traits would likely later incline them toward the Republican Party, even if they had immigrated without living through Castro. Indeed, it is known that Cuban-Americans are disproportionately white relative to the Cuban population as a whole (85% <sup>1</sup> versus 64% <sup>2</sup>), indicating that those who immigrated were substantially different from those who stayed according to at least one demographic variable.

The case of (mostly Jewish) immigrants from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) is similar. Donald Trump won 84% of the Republican primary vote in Brooklyn's Brighton Beach neighborhood, historically an enclave for Russian-speaking immigrants (Bagri, 2016). Some of the most extensive existing surveys of the Russian-Jewish immigrant population suggested that 60-70% would support Donald Trump in the 2016 general election (Khazan, 2016). This phenomenon is not limited to Donald Trump's candidacy. Russian-Jewish immigrants reported casting predominantly Republican ballots in the 2004, 2008, and 2012 presidential elections. This immigrant group looks like the mirror image of the native-born Jewish population, approximately 64% of whom reported identifying as Democrats or Democratic leaners in a recent Pew survey (Study, 2014). Differences in attitudes between recent Russian Jewish immigrants and the native-born Jewish population are often hypothesized to result from the experience and trauma of Soviet life, but one can again propose other explanations whereby the home country experience itself has no real impact on political preferences or behaviors.

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<sup>1</sup>Sharon R. Ennis, Merarys Ríos-Vargas, Nora G. Albert (May 2011). "The Hispanic Population: 2010" (PDF). U.S. Census Bureau. p. 14 (Table 6) available at [link](#).

<sup>2</sup>Table II.4 Population by sex and area of residence according to age groups and skin colour (PDF) (in Spanish). National Office of Statistics and Information, Republic of Cuba. Available at [link](#).

In this study, we provide strong evidence that experience in one's country of origin has a substantial impact on current political behavior and attitudes. We do so by merging extensive, novel immigration records to contemporary voter files and implementing a within-family research design. Our data include over 600,000 immigrants who entered the United States as refugees with assistance from the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) between 1938 and 2016. This sample of administrative data includes immigrants from a total of 74 countries across the globe, including the FSU and Cuba. It comprises, to our knowledge, the largest cross-section of observational political registration and turnout for immigrants to the United States. Although our work was aided by the digitization of immigrant case files by the American Jewish Historical Society (AJHS), especially for 1980 onwards, we have also conducted large amounts of original data collection and digitization of archival records. The final data set greatly increases the detail and temporal coverage of digitized HIAS immigrant records.

Our analysis of these data supports the hypothesis that immigrants' birth country contexts shape their political affiliations after immigration, and substantiates press accounts tying contemporary political attitudes to their experiences in their country of origin. Specifically, we find that each additional year of residence in a refugee's country of origin increases her probability of participation in presidential and midterm elections by 0.8% and 2.3%, respectively. Additionally, refugees who have more time of exposure in their country of birth are more likely to register as Republicans than immigrants who have fewer years of exposure. Finally, to explore the mechanisms of these findings, we fielded a survey of the HIAS client population via Facebook to gain insight into *how* birth country contexts might have influenced immigrants' political frames of reference in the United States. We find that those who immigrated at a young age exhibit highly correlated and typically liberal attitudes on logically orthogonal issues such as guns, abortion, race, and redistribution, while those who immigrated at an older age are more conservative across issues and exhibit weaker correlations between orthogonal issues. Our interpretation of the difference in these correlations is that older-arriving immigrants exhibit less ideological constraint as conventionally understood in the United States context (Converse, 1964). Our argument is not that older arriving immigrants are immune to this important phe-

nomena, but rather that the exact shape of dynamic constraint is imprinted over the course of childhood and into young adulthood through experiences in the reference country context (Superti and Gidron, 2021).

While our findings on issue attitudes are consistent with the main results on registration, they do not explain why older-arriving immigrants are more conservative as opposed to more liberal, or more politically engaged as opposed to less. We propose and discuss four hypotheses explaining why exposure to country of origin in this particular client population manifests as increased conservatism and civic activity: *reactionaryism, political and economic learning, acquired cultural values, and aspiration for integrated dominance*. In so doing, we suggest some possible avenues for a future research agenda on the political behaviors and preferences of refugees and immigrants.

## 2 Immigrant Political Attitudes

### 2.1 Political Socialization

The idea of “political socialization,” or the process by which family, community, and environment help construct political views among native-born Americans and encourage them to participate in politics (or not), has been a central thread in the study of American political identity for decades. Scholars have long understood that political attitudes and identities develop in response to the context prevailing throughout an individual’s formative years. This context is defined by several major components. The first of these is parents’ political attitudes and behaviors. The family is thought to host an individual’s first political conversations and initial avenues of exposure to the prevailing political climate and how to interact with it. Accordingly, parents’ political views can be powerful determinants of their children’s political attitudes and behaviors, particularly when politics is salient at home and parents have homogeneous views (Hyman, 1959; Davies, 1965; Jennings and Niemi, 1968; Plutzer, 2002; Jennings and Bowers, 2009). Numerous studies have offered strong correlations between the political attitudes among parents and children as evidence of socialization via intergenerational transmission (Almond and Verba,

1963; Tedin, 1974; Jennings and Bowers, 2009), but these focus exclusively on the intergenerational stability of attitudes *within* country.

Other researchers have pointed to the importance of peer and cohort context for the formation of political attitudes (Harvey, 1972; Sebert, Jennings and Niemi, 1974; Beck, 1977; Tedin, 1980). In particular, researchers have suggested that peers can shape social, cultural, and political tastes, and can reinforce prevailing political attitudes. Individuals typically go through formative civic experiences in or outside of school along with peers, and these shared experiences can define political attitudes across peer cohorts. Similarly, experiencing critical moments in American political history as a cohort group can help cement shared reflections and political orientations (Jennings and Niemi, 1968; Jennings and Bowers, 2009; Lajevardi, 2020).

While it's likely that people outside the United States experience political socialization similarly in response to prevailing political institutions or important political or cultural moments within their countries, traditional theories describing political socialization fail to account for the nature and diversity of immigrant experiences in the United States (Cho, 1995). The reasons for this are numerous. Citizenship requirements and language proficiency, for instance, represent meaningful barriers to political participation for immigrants in a way that does not apply to the native-born, making outcomes more difficult to observe in immigrant populations. Similarly, political socialization occurs outside of the U.S. context for immigrants, making its implications difficult to map to any U.S. political context. Immigrants "rarely come to a new host society as fully formed and well adapted political selves" (Wong et al., 2011).

Accordingly, researchers have paid considerable attention to other aspects of immigration, such as: fertility and health outcomes (Guendelman et al., 1990; Hill and Johnson, 2002; Kahn, 1994); occupational mobility between generations and other economic outcomes (Chiswick, 1977; Borjas, 1987, 1999; Portes and Zhou, 1993); language acquisition, intermarriage, residential segregation, and racial and ethnic identification (Massey and Denton, 1992; Frey, 1996; Portes and Rumbaut, 1996, 2001; Alba and Nee, 2003; Wong et al., 2011). Questions surrounding the formation of immigrant political identities, however, have been left relatively understudied.

## 2.2 Birth Country Context

The idea that the political characteristics of an immigrant's country of birth might influence her experience in the United States first appeared in relatively early studies of immigration. Writing about Eastern European immigrants arriving in the United States in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, [Handlin \(1951\)](#) noted that new arrivals came from largely undemocratic regimes. But there was little consensus on *how* this might matter. For [Handlin \(1951\)](#), the very idea of participation in government might seem strange and alienating to new immigrants. Beyond alienation, coming of age in a repressive regime may have left immigrants with a persistent distrust or fear of the government. This fear may have discouraged immigrants from interacting with their new state, even just to cast a ballot. Yet some immigrants who left undemocratic or repressive regimes for political reasons might have done so *precisely* because they desired more opportunity to participate in politics. Empirical demonstrations of either argument are rare, but more recent studies of Cuban immigrants have suggested *higher* rates of political participation in the United States relative to immigrants from other Hispanic subgroups who were not fleeing repressive regimes ([Portes and Mozo, 1985](#); [Arvizu and Garcia, 1996](#)).

Still, there is some evidence that Cuban-Americans may be an exceptional case. [Collet \(2000\)](#) finds that Vietnamese immigrants express more distrust of the government relative to members of other Asian-American subgroups fleeing less repressive regimes. Using a much more extensive survey of first generation immigrants from various ethnic groups, [Ramakrishnan \(2005\)](#) reported that people from countries with repressive regimes were *less* likely to participate by voting. Asian-American immigrants from countries governed under repressive regimes were the only exception to this pattern. With the exception of Latino immigrants, survey respondents from countries governed by communist regimes were similarly less likely to participate; Latino immigrants from communist regimes were more likely to have reported voting – a result [Ramakrishnan \(2005\)](#) suggests is driven by Cuban-American immigrants.

More recent empirical investigations of the role political culture and institutions play in shaping immigrants' political attitudes has expanded our focus beyond immigrants from

116		LIBHABER		JULIO		FRADA		62-1664	
CASE SURNAME		1. MAN		2. WOMAN		CITY AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE		CASA NO.	
ALT. SURNAMES		CITY AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE		CASA NO.		CITY AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE		CASA NO.	
Cuba		Cuba		Cuba		Cuba		Cuba	
CASE UNIT MEMBERS		BIRTHDATE		CY OF BIRTH		MS		REL TO #1	
JOEL		7-8-08		Pd		Div		3-17-69	
KOPEL (MN)		2-8-22		Pd		Div		W 6-27-65	
Felix		1-11-43		Cb		S		S 5-21-62	
# 2- 1045 10th St		Miami Beach Fla		7-12-65		5-29-62			
# 8 = 838 Midway Dr		Miami Beach Fla		5-25-62					
1037 7 St		Miami Beach Fla		new address		-65		DEPT. M	
HQ UMS 12/54 MASTER CARD		815- 83rd St., Miami Bch., Fla.		FORM C-41205-1A					

(a) Front

INTERESTED U. S. PERSONS		ADDRESS		REL. TO #1	
A/ BLANK: GODIL & Luba		Miami Fla		BL&sisL	
B/ BLANK: DAVID & ZOILA		Miami Fla		61- 1906	
C/ BLANK: Jacob & Sara		60- 3316			
D/ KOPEL: DAVID & SARA		61- 455 Fla		BL&sisL	
E/ KOPEL: SCHARJA & GHANA		61- 986 Fla			
F/ KOPEL: JOSE & ZIATA		60- 2408 Fla		BL & sis I	
G/ NEZWADOWITZ: GABRIEL & ROSA		62- 3599 Cb		BL & sisL	
H/ KOPEL: Szloma & Marta		61-3890		BL&sisL	
I/ KOPEL: GARY & CHANA		San Domingo		BL & sisL	
CASE SURNAME		1. MAN		2. WOMAN	
LIBHABER		JULIO		FRADA	
CASE NO.		62-1664			

(b) Back

Figure 1: Example Immigration Card from the Administrative Files, 1955-1980.

single, specific countries of origin. Using survey data collected from over 110 countries, [Acemoglu et al. \(2021\)](#) find that immigrants with longer periods of exposure to functioning democracies are more likely to express support for democratic institutions. One potential implication of this research is that it is not exclusively a state's repressive actions that can suppress political participation among immigrants downstream, but failures to extend representation to sufficient numbers of people, enforce rule of law, and perform other basic democratic functions that can discourage attitudinal investments in democratic norms and institutions.

### 3 Merging Refugee Records to the Voter File

While questions about political socialization have always loomed large in political science, understanding how this phenomenon relates to immigrants has proven difficult because of the challenges involved with reaching immigrant populations through surveys or census data. Typically, even if these populations are reached, lack of individual identification in the data makes it hard to make strong inferences given identification challenges.

By contrast, our project leverages novel data derived from HIAS's administrative files. HIAS was founded in the late 19th century and has historically, but not exclusively, served a Jewish client population. It is the oldest of nine major resettlement agencies in the United States, and it provides numerous and varied services, including legal, financial, job search,



and social support services.<sup>3</sup> In 2016, AJHS entered into a partnership with HIAS to become the caretaker of HIAS's immense, centuries-spanning set of administrative files.<sup>4</sup> For our purposes, a key fruit of this partnership was the creation of a web-accessible database of client names and case numbers to support genealogical (and other) research.<sup>5</sup> Using web-scraping techniques, we were able to obtain a copy of this database (henceforth the AJHS database).

The AJHS database has two parts covering the pre-electronic and post-electronic eras. For clients who immigrated (roughly) between 1980 and 2016, the AJHS data is extracted from the directory table of HIAS's master client database. It describes 512,942 individual immigrants via details such as first and last name, country of birth, arrival date, and case number. For clients who immigrated between (roughly) 1955 and 1980, the AJHS database was made by the hand-coding of a physical index card system. The database covers 41,685 case files (cards) and for each file includes the last name, man's name, woman's name, country of origin, case number, and registration date. Additionally, digital scans of the physical index cards are also provided.

Figure 1 provides an example of what these cards look like. We contracted with a vendor to extend the manual coding of the scanned index card files to the additional fields that were available on these cards but not yet coded by AJHS. These additional fields include information about family members beyond head(s) of household, as well as birth date, country of birth, marital status, relationship to the head of household, arrival date, arrival address, and the names of related cases and interested persons. In total, our extensive supplemental hand-coding of scanned index cards yielded information on 122,819 additional individual immigrants.

Whatever their source, AJHS's records always describe the names of clients and their case numbers. By definition, individuals with common case numbers immigrated together. Inspection of these files reveals that a particular case number usually corresponds with a nuclear family, however it may occasionally include cousins, in-laws, or more dis-

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<sup>3</sup>See the HIAS website for more information: <https://www.hias.org/what/resettling-refugees>

<sup>4</sup>Details on this collaboration are extensively documented at: <https://ontherescuefront.wordpress.com/>

<sup>5</sup>The website can be accessed here: <https://ajhs.org/hias-search>

tant relations. 95% of case files include six individuals or fewer and 99% include no more than 8 individuals. The 1% of larger case files typically include very large families and, at the very top-end, several families with presumably tight connections.

To connect these administrative files to political behavioral outcomes, we leveraged a recent national voter file<sup>6</sup> and followed a multi-stage matching procedure. Initially, we focus on matching individuals with unique names and birth dates (where available). We then allow increasing flexibility for mis-spellings or dating errors while still enforcing uniqueness. Additional details are provided in the Supplemental Appendix, including some discussion of alternative matching procedures we initially explored. Our match rate for the post-1980 group was 30%, while the match rate pre-1980 was around 5%.<sup>7</sup>

While HIAS case files and voter files are the administrative data that make up the core of our study, we also fielded a Facebook survey to explore the mechanisms behind our findings. We provide more details on this survey after describing our principal empirical findings.

## 4 Empirical Strategy

How can we identify the causal effect of childhood environment on political preferences and participation? Our main empirical strategy involves using a family fixed effects model. This model is useful for our purposes because it identifies differences in party registration or election participation by comparing children within the same family. This effectively allows us to control for a number of factors that are a) common to the family; b) might be influencing the outcome variables; and c) are not ones that we can directly observe. These include family traditions, parenting practices, genetics, religious intensity, and other factors.

Our key independent variable in this model is age at arrival, with the estimated coefficient on this variable telling us how arriving a year later in childhood, relative to one's sibling(s), affects the key outcome variables. We include other controls in the model that

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<sup>6</sup>Specifically, L2's 2018 national voter file.

<sup>7</sup>Note the median age of a pre-1980 HIAS immigrant is about 96, so this difference is not surprising.

might be affecting differences in outcomes outside of family and year of arrival – variables such as a child’s gender and arrival year. Gender could be different between siblings and those differences could be affecting political preferences or participation and in rare cases children in the same family might not arrive in the destination country at the same time.

Having built these controls into the model, we introduce our key assumption: conditional on these controls, each child’s age at arrival is random. We are not the first to use the family fixed effects model in conjunction with this assumption and we believe it is reasonable to do so for several reasons.<sup>8</sup> First, given that these families are refugees, moves out of countries of origin are likely to be ones of opportunity rather than precisely timed. Parental strategies around time of move, to the extent that they might be relevant for a child’s political behavior later in life, are thus unlikely to be a concern. Second, from the perspective of the children, the age at which they move is indeed likely to be exogenous, conditional on family fixed effects. Any given child is unlikely to possess a trait, independent of family characteristics also shared by a sibling, that allows the child to both convince the parents to move him or her at a particular age and affects future voting preferences and behavior.

We visualize the data and provide descriptive analyses, but the family fixed effects model is the specification that directly studies the causal link between childhood exposure and our outcomes of interest. By comparing siblings within a family who arrive at different ages, we identify the causal effect of an additional year of childhood spent in the country of origin. In doing so, we break the endogeneity issues posed by correlations between environment and outcomes.

One potential threat to inference that may present itself within families is child rearing as it relates to birth order. That is, if parents really did treat older children systematically differently than they treated younger children – and did this in a way that produced more political engagement and conservative-leaning political orientation in older children – we could not interpret our results as a function of each child’s level of exposure to birth country political context. Instead, differences between children would result from differences

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<sup>8</sup>Chetty and Hendren (2018) is among the most prominent applications of this model and assumption. It measures the effects of neighborhoods on intergenerational mobility.

in the treatment they received from their parents rather than from reactions to their birth country environments. While it is certainly possible that some parents treat older and younger children differently, to be a threat to inference in our case parents across families, cultures, and time periods would have to treat older and younger children differently in roughly the same way and in one that affects political behavior. While some families are likely to be stricter with older children than with younger ones, for instance, we have no reason to believe that this is the case on average across all families in our data.

In fact, existing studies that address the question of birth order give us confidence that variation in how children of different ages are parented is not a likely source of confounding for our design. While some studies have suggested that parents are likely to supervise older children with more intensity than younger children (Averett, Argys and Rees, 2011), partially as a result of anxiety over the challenges of parenting for the first time and partially as the result of simply being younger and possessed of more energy when their first children are born, there is no evidence that parental supervision itself produces systematically different outlook or behavior among children. The majority of empirical research into the relationships between birth order and psychological, sociological, or political outcomes has consistently found no systematic patterns connecting birth order to any of these (Ernst and Angst, 1983).

The one notable exception is a series of findings suggesting that older children are broadly more likely to be morally conservative than younger ones, especially with regard to sexual mores (Argys et al., 2006; Urbatsch, 2014). Yet researchers investigating this topic have also reported that this is not the result of systematically different parenting; if anything, more liberal attitudes among younger children in this arena are driven by older siblings (Buonanno and Vanin, 2013).

Additionally, there is no evidence that this form of moral conservatism maps closely to broader politics or predicts political participation at all (Førland, Korsvik and Christophersen, 2012; Freese, Powell and Steelman, 1999), and similarly little evidence that birth order is more predictive of even these attitudes than other covariates like age (Urbatsch, 2014). Accordingly, we see no reason to anticipate that within-family variation in approaches to parenting systematically affects the results we present in the next section.

## 5 Results

### 5.1 Sample Characteristics

The matching process described above leaves us with a data set of 7,822 individuals and 4,074 families from 76 different countries. These are individuals for whom crucial information such as age at arrival and voting history are available. 6,387 of these individuals have at least one sibling and arrived in the U.S. as children, which we define as younger than 21 years old. The children come from 74 different countries of origin, but are concentrated in a few: the top-5 sending countries – Soviet Union, Russia, Ukraine, Egypt, and Cuba – represent 56.2% of the sample.<sup>9</sup> Figure 2 presents the top 10 countries of origin for those arriving as children.




Figure 2: Top 10 Countries of Origin

Note: Top 10 countries of origin, by number of people arriving as children (under age 21), are shown. The total number of countries of origin in the data is 74.

Panel A in Figure 3 shows the distribution of years of arrival for the child arrivals. The

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<sup>9</sup>Countries of origin are classified by their names at the time of departure, giving us some individuals who, for example, fled the Soviet Union and others who fled Russia.

distribution is very similar for the whole sample. Although our earliest refugees came to the U.S. in 1938 and the latest in 2005, there are two main waves of migration. The Egyptian and Cuban refugees flee Nasser and Castro in the late 1950s and 1960s, while the refugees from the former Soviet Union depart for the U.S. in the 1980s and 1990s. Those individuals drive the pattern visible in Panel A.




Figure 3: Descriptive Distributions

Note: Panel A shows the distribution of individuals arriving as children (under the age of 21), by year of arrival. Panel B shows the distribution of individuals who arrive as children and who have siblings, by the age gap between siblings.

Panel B in Figure 3 presents a distribution of the children with siblings in our data according to the age gap between the siblings. Most of our children have siblings who are 10 years or fewer apart from them. The outliers, those with a greater than 10 year gap, are possibly cousins rather than brothers or sisters. Excluding these outliers from our analyses produces very similar results.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup>The only exception is that our result on voting in 2016, while of a similar magnitude, is no longer statis-




Figure 4: Probability of Voting by Age at Arrival

Note: Panel A shows the probability that an individual arriving at a particular age in the U.S. votes in the 2016 general (presidential) election. Panel B shows the probability that an individual arriving at a particular age in the U.S. votes in the 2014 general (midterm) election. In both Panels A and B, the specification includes no controls, no fixed effects, and no restrictions on age at arrival. Charts show binned scatter plots, with each circle an average over an equal number of data points. Errors are clustered at the level of the state in which an individual is registered to vote. Standard errors on the age at arrival variable are shown in parentheses.

## 5.2 Voting Behavior

We are interested in understanding whether there is a relationship between age at arrival in the U.S. and an individual's political engagement and preferences later in life. Numerous studies have shown a causal relationship between exposure to a particular environment, especially in childhood, and one's income, health, and education, among other outcomes. We use our data to understand whether environment shapes political preferences and behaviors. Since our voting pattern data are only available for those who are registered to vote, we are limited to studying only those who are civically engaged enough to register.

Panel A of Figure 4 shows the unconditional relationship between age at arrival and the probability of voting in the 2016 general election. The binned scatter plot reveals a fairly linear relationship, with every additional year associated with a 0.32 percentage point increase in the probability of voting in 2016. Here we are of course concerned with numerous omitted variables driving the pattern, but the pattern does suggest that more years of life spent in the origin country that a refugee ultimately flees for the U.S. results in a higher probability of voting in U.S. elections later in life.

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tically significant.

Figure 4’s Panel B presents the same relationship, but for the 2014 midterm election instead. Every additional year is associated with a 0.68 percentage point increase in the probability of voting, suggesting that environmental exposure might be playing a bigger role in generating turnout during the less-salient midterm elections than the more-salient presidential elections. Panels A and B show that the probability of voting in the 2014 midterm election is considerably lower than in the 2016 presidential election, as one would expect.

To see whether there is indeed a causal relationship between age at arrival and the probability of voting, we estimate family fixed effects regressions of the following form:

$$y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta ArrivalAge_{ij} + \theta Female_{ij} + \kappa ArrivalYear_{ij} + \omega_{ij} + \phi_j + \eta_{ij} \quad (1)$$

where  $y_{ij}$  is the outcome of child  $i$  in family  $j$ ,  $Female_{ij}$  is a dummy variable for the child’s gender,  $ArrivalAge_{ij}$  is the child’s age at arrival in the U.S.,  $ArrivalYear_{ij}$  is the year of arrival in the U.S.,  $\omega_i$  is a fixed effect for the current state of residence, and  $\phi_j$  is a family fixed effect that captures unobserved family characteristics that are common to all siblings in the same family.<sup>11</sup>  $\eta_{ij}$  denotes the error term. We cluster standard errors at the state level in all model estimations.

This specification allows for a *within family* analysis that compares differences in the political behaviors and preferences of siblings. This approach takes care of a lot of concerns that we might have from Panels A and B in Figure 4, since siblings come from the same country of origin, share a similar upbringing, and in almost all cases share the exact same immigration experience. Controlling additionally for sibling differences in gender and year of arrival in the U.S., as well as for more recent influences that might come from the current state of residence, we zero in on the causal effect of environmental exposure on political behaviors and preferences.

Panels A and B of Figure 5 present a residualized binned scatter plot of the relationship between age at arrival and voting in 2016 and 2014, respectively.

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<sup>11</sup>We use a linear term for *ArrivalAge* instead of a series of dummy variables because Panels A and B in Figure 4 show a fairly linear unconditional relationship between voting and age at arrival.






Figure 5: Probability of Voting by Age at Arrival, Sibling Comparison

Note: Panel A shows the probability that an individual arriving at a particular age in the U.S. votes in the 2016 general (presidential) election. Panel B shows the probability that an individual arriving at a particular age in the U.S. votes in the 2014 general (midterm) election. In both Panels A and B, the specification includes controls for gender and arrival year, as well as family and current state fixed effects. Charts show binned scatter plots, with each circle an average over an equal number of data points. Errors are clustered at the level of the state in which an individual is registered to vote. Standard errors on the age at arrival variable are shown in parentheses.

The positive, mostly linear relationship we saw in Figure 4 is present here as well. The slopes, however, are even steeper in the sibling analysis: 0.54 percentage points and 0.71 percentage points for the 2016 presidential and 2014 midterm elections, respectively. With 67% of our sibling sample voting in the 2016 election, every year of later arrival is equivalent to a 0.8% increase in the probability of voting in a general presidential election.<sup>12</sup> In 2014, 30.8% of the sample voted, translating our effect into a 2.3% increase in the probability of voting in a general midterm election. As with our unconditional look at the relationship between voting and time spent outside of the U.S., the sibling analysis demonstrates a larger effect of environmental exposure on midterm election turnout than on presidential election turnout.

Assessed in concert, the unconditional and conditional analyses provide strong evidence that the more time a refugee spends in the country that they are fleeing, the more likely they will be to vote once in the U.S. The fact that the effect is larger, in percentage terms, in midterm than in presidential elections lends credence to the appreciation hypothesis: more time spent in an authoritarian regime, without the freedom to participate

<sup>12</sup>According to a Pew analysis, 86.8% of registered voters cast a ballot in 2016, so turnout among refugees in our sample is lower than in the general population. Source: <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/03/in-past-elections-u-s-trailed-most-developed-countries-in-voter-turnout/>

in a democratic electoral process, leads to a greater appreciation for this freedom once in the U.S. The consistency of our findings across model specifications and a sample with many different countries of origin suggests that our results are not driven by sibling or family dynamics or by sample selection.

### 5.3 Party Affiliation

Does environmental exposure have an effect not only on voting behavior but also on party affiliation? We answer this question with the same approach as above, but now turning the outcome variable into a dummy variable for an individual's party registration.

Figure 6 illustrates the unconditional relationship between age at arrival and party affiliation as measured in 2018 using our whole sample. The figure reveals another linear trend: the later the age at arrival and thus the more exposure a refugee has to their country of origin, the more likely they are to be registered as a Republican in 2018. The increase with every year of about 0.39 percentage points comes almost entirely at the expense of registration with the Democratic Party. There is no relationship between registration as a Non-Partisan or Independent and age at arrival.

Applying the specification in (1) to do a sibling comparison for party affiliation, we find a similar pattern. Panels A to C in Figure 7 reveal that every additional year spent in the country of origin decreases the probability of being registered as a Democrat by 0.86 percentage points or 2.2%, while increasing the probability of being registered as a Republican by 0.57 percentage points or 2.3%, and budging Non-Partisan or Independent registration by 0.24 percentage points or about 0.7%. The increases in Republican and Non-Partisan registration are not statistically significant, but must in sum absorb the negative effect on Democratic Party registration by construction.

As with political engagement and voting, the consistency of our results across unconditional and conditional analyses of effects on party affiliation is encouraging. Since the majority of the refugees in our sample flee not just authoritarian but also socialist regimes, our results suggest that greater exposure to such regimes increases the probability that a refugee will gravitate towards the more conservative political party once in the destina-




Figure 6: Probability of Party Registration by Age at Arrival

Note: Panel A shows the probability that an individual arriving at a particular age in the U.S. is registered with the Democratic Party. Panel B shows the probability that an individual arriving at a particular age in the U.S. is registered with the Republican Party, and Panel C shows the same for a Non-Partisan or Independent registration. Party registration is measured in 2018. The specification used here includes no controls, no family fixed effects, and no restriction on age at arrival. Charts show binned scatter plots, with each circle an average over an equal number of data points. Errors are clustered at the level of the state in which an individual is registered to vote. Standard errors on the age at arrival variable are shown in parentheses.

tion country.

## 5.4 Survey Results

In order to shed more light on political beliefs and behaviors among refugee immigrants resettled by HIAS, we recruited survey participants who could provide us with more information about their experiences in their birth countries, their immigration experiences, and their political views and behaviors. Recruiting a representative sample from this population is a challenging task. There is no complete, publicly available record of the




Figure 7: Probability of Party Registration by Age at Arrival, Sibling Comparison

Note: Panel A shows the probability that an individual arriving at a particular age in the U.S. is registered with the Democratic Party. Panel B shows the probability that an individual arriving at a particular age in the U.S. is registered with the Republican Party, and Panel C shows the same for a Non-Partisan or Independent registration. Party registration is measured in 2018. The specification includes controls for gender and arrival year, as well as family and current state fixed effects, so the relationships shown graphically here are residualized. Charts show binned scatter plots, with each circle an average over an equal number of data points. Errors are clustered at the level of the state in which an individual is registered to vote. Standard errors on the age at arrival variable are shown in parentheses.

refugee immigrant population currently living in the United States – much less comprehensive records of the resident population assisted by HIAS. There are also few observable population targets that might be used to indicate that an individual belongs to this group, since refugee immigrants span various nations, settlement locations, and racial and ethnic categories, thus making it difficult for any survey recruiter to select respondents into the correct sample.

Given these challenges, we opted to field our survey in online communities of self-identified immigrants to the U.S. who used HIAS’s assistance during the immigration

process. We provided access to our survey instrument via several Facebook groups<sup>13</sup> whose membership consisted of refugees likely to appear in the HIAS data.<sup>14</sup> We also encouraged members to share the survey with friends, family, or community members who might have been immigrants with similar experiences. 231 respondents participated in the survey, and 153 of them provided us with information detailing their age at the moment of immigration to the United States.

The majority of survey participants in our data immigrated to the U.S. from Ukraine. Most respondents arrived in the United States either between 1977 and 1981 or in a subsequent wave between 1987 and 1991. Women constitute approximately 60% of respondents, who are also overwhelmingly (91%) white, 53 years of age on average, are likely to have completed at least a 4 year college degree (89%), be employed full time, and have a household income of over \$150,000. 55% of respondents who provided information on their 2020 vote choice say they voted for Donald Trump, and 91% claim to have voted in the 2020 presidential election. The modal respondent in our data identifies as a Republican (57/149), which is generally consistent with extant survey research on this population. More detailed graphical summaries of the respondent pool appear in the Appendix.

To address questions about the mechanisms that might drive our observed differences between immigrants who came here at younger vs. older ages, we elicited social and policy views from respondents across a variety of issues that tend to correlate strongly with both left-right political mapping and party identification in the U.S. Specifically, we asked respondents to provide their views on immigration (whether immigration to the U.S. should be made easier, more difficult, or remain essentially the same); abortion (whether abortion should be legal in all, some, or no cases); guns (whether the existing gun control regime should be stricter, more lax, or remain essentially the same); Israel (both whether they supported Trump's executive order to recognize Jerusalem as the nation's capitol and whether the United States should increase military aid to Israel); and

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<sup>13</sup>Details on the groups targeted are available in the Appendix. They had names such as "Soviet Immigrants of the Vienna-Rome Pipeline", "My past in Ladispoli, Rome", or "Russian Speaking Immigrants in America"

<sup>14</sup>Survey responses were collected anonymously, so while respondents have public Facebook profiles, these profiles were never linked to individual responses and we did not ask respondents to provide identifying information on the survey.

the economy (whether or not inequality was a problem, whether federal spending on the poor should be increased, and whether or not corporations could be trusted to do business safely and fairly without intervention).

We also asked respondents to complete a racial attitudes battery following [Kinder and Sanders \(1996\)](#).<sup>15</sup> The idea behind this would be to capture identity-based rather than policy-driven motivations for affiliating with the Democratic or Republican parties. The full text of this survey instrument is available in the Appendix. Responses are ordered Likert scales that we convert to numeric values using integers corresponding to each level. The lowest values are associated with the most liberal end of the spectrum and the highest with the most conservative.

Given the difficulty of recruiting respondents and concerns about statistical power, we include all respondents (even those who immigrated as adults) in our analysis. We split our sample into older and younger arrivals using a cutoff of 21 years.<sup>16</sup> Table 1 summarizes a series of t-tests comparing the average policy views among older and younger arrivals across various social and policy issues. Several things are worth pointing out about these results. First, respondents who came to the U.S. as younger children tend to take more liberal positions on all of these questions. Group mean scores for younger respondents tend to be lower for younger respondents across the board.

Second, all respondents are relatively ambivalent on economic questions. Questions about whether or not there is too much inequality today and whether corporations can be trusted to do business fairly and safely are scored on a 5-point Likert scale of agreement-

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<sup>15</sup>In Table 1, Racism Rare addresses whether respondents agree with the statement that racism manifests in rare incidents in the U.S. Trying Hard addresses whether respondents agree with the statement that it's really a matter of individual effort and Black people living in the United States could be as well off as other groups if they tried harder. Bootstraps assesses whether respondents agree with the statement that Black people could pull themselves up by their bootstraps like Irish Americans, Italian Americans, and members of other immigrant groups. Privilege refers to the extent to which respondents recognize white privilege, and Deservingness refers to agreement with the statement that Black people in the U.S. have gotten less than they deserve. The index row for racial attitudes just refers to the sum of scores across all racial attitude battery items.

<sup>16</sup>It is worth noting that our identification strategy in the prior section involves comparing behaviors between older and younger childhood arrivals, while the exploratory analysis here includes adult arrivals as well. While adult arrivals may differ in important ways from childhood arrivals, restricting the survey data in the same way as the administrative data would so reduce the sample size that meaningful differences would be hard to notice. Moreover, the less restricted sample can still offer richer, more qualitatively interesting data useful for evaluating hypotheses about deeper mechanisms.

disagreement. Scores between above 2 but below 4 generally correspond to the “neither agree nor disagree” category. Scores of approximately 2 on the poverty question correspond roughly to arguing that federal spending on the poor should be kept constant. These responses are not generally consistent with the idea that a firmly conservative, pro-deregulation and anti-redistribution set of economic ideas are the primary drivers of party identification for members of this immigrant population.

Third, the most significant differences in attitudes between older and younger respondents to this survey occur in the racial attitudes response items. These are similarly scored on 5-point Likert scales, where scores above 3 indicate racially conservative attitudes. Respondents who immigrated to the U.S. at ages over 20 *average* racially conservative scores on these questions and on the index.

Finally, while these results are not directly visible in Table 1, our results also suggest that respondents who come to the United States as younger children typically look like more consistent liberals or conservatives across policy issues. The correlation between the racial attitudes index and a similar summation-based index of responses to the economic questions is much higher among younger arrivals ( $\rho = 0.82$ ) than it is among older arrivals ( $\rho = 0.68$ ). This is similarly true for correlations in policy views on the economy and gun control ( $\rho = 0.74$  for younger arrivals and  $\rho = 0.64$  for older arrivals). This suggests that younger arrivals may be likelier to have more traditional clusters of left-right policy views (that is, people with more liberal views on the economy are likely to *also* have more liberal views on gun control and race). These results are consistent with the idea that immigrants who arrive as children become more assimilated to the political context in their new country, while immigrants who spent more time in their home country still retain clusters of policy views that reflect their home country experiences.

## Discussion

Individually-identified data on immigrants are hard for researchers to come by, especially in large and systematic quantities. Where such large administrative data are found, they enable strong designs like those involving comparisons between siblings. Our princi-

Table 1: Differences in Social & Policy Views Between Older & Younger Arrivals

Issue	Older Arrival Mean	Younger Arrival Mean	t Statistic	p Value
Immigration	2.175	1.982	1.467	0.145
Abortion	1.392	1.357	0.389	0.698
Guns	1.762	1.679	0.593	0.555
Israel: Jerusalem	4.250	4.091	0.865	0.389
Israel: Military Aid	3.362	3.255	1.059	0.292
Race: Racism Rare	2.619	2.310	1.258	0.211
Race: Trying Hard	3.131	2.759	1.432	0.155
Race: Bootstraps	3.807	3.207	2.309	0.023
Race: Privilege	3.167	2.793	1.377	0.171
Race: Deservingness	3.774	3.241	2.041	0.044
Race: Slavery	3.060	2.793	1.006	0.317
Race: Index	19.578	17.103	1.859	0.066
Inequality	2.538	2.404	0.553	0.581
Spending on Poor	2.175	1.965	1.587	0.115
Corporations	2.567	2.184	1.568	0.120

Note: Table represents t-tests for differences in group mean indexed responses between older and younger arrivals to the United States. Older arrivals are respondents who immigrated at age 21 or older. Rows refer to specific survey response items with ordinal answer options. See Appendix for full text of each survey item. Response options coded using integer values such that most liberal responses are marked as 1 and most conservative responses are assigned the highest possible value for each item. Highest possible values vary depending on available response options. The racial attitudes index is calculated by summing respondent scores across all of the individual items in the racial attitudes battery.

pal findings from analyzing the HIAS client population is that each additional year spent in the country of origin is associated with an increased tendency both to vote and to affiliate with the Republican Party. These results are consistent whether one looks *within* or *between* families. Although the coefficients we report are “only” several percentages per year, the differences between someone who immigrates as an infant and someone who immigrates as a young adult are quite large.

One key question about these results is whether this effect is driven by more time in the country of origin or less time in the destination country. Logically, one implies the other, and one must not overlook this issue of interpretation. Our survey evidence reveals that younger immigrants exhibit more “partisan constraint” in their thinking about logically disconnected political issues, and we view differences in political socialization as the most plausible driver of these differences. In particular, our surveys show that immigrants who were younger arrivals tend to have conventionally liberal / democratic preferences on economic and social issues, while immigrants who were older arrivals have strong conserva-



tive tendencies, but also respond quite atypically for American conservatives to numerous survey items (e.g. they tend to be more liberal on abortion and Second Amendment rights than native-born conservative identifiers). Older immigrants formed their political preferences and values in a different environment than younger immigrants, likely explaining why younger immigrants to the United States have political preferences that more closely resemble the general American population.

While these findings present important evidence about the existence of environmental effects beyond the family and beyond the immigration context, they also raise harder to resolve questions about why the results take this particular shape. Why do later-arriving immigrants in our study tend to affiliate more with a right-wing party as opposed to a left-wing party? Under what conditions might one expect later arriving immigrants to be no more likely to vote and no more likely to exhibit right-wing bias than earlier-in-life arrivals? Similar questions have been raised about what explains the right-wing populist tendencies of disadvantaged whites in many democracies (e.g. [Gidron and Hall, 2020](#)). Yet such support among refugees for right-wing parties is perhaps even more puzzling, since at least superficially they would appear uncomfortably close to immigrant-bashing ethno-nationalist groups.

The evidence gathered and analyzed thus far provides limited insights as to what exactly it is about country of origin that drives behaviors. This is especially the case where there is little variation with respect to some aspects of country context. Almost all of the countries of origin in our sample had authoritarian governments at the time the refugees departed, so sub-group analysis by country of origin on these data would not go very far. Nevertheless, we propose four hypotheses that could form the basis of further and deeper work into these puzzles, perhaps looking at other immigrant populations or in a more granular way within these client populations. In particular, we propose that the right-leaning and participatory tendencies could result from (a) reactionaryism, (b) political and economic learning, (c) acquired cultural values, and / or (d) aspirational integrated dominance. We describe these theories in greater detail and evaluate to what extent they can explain the particulars of our data.

The reactionaryism hypothesis starts with the supposition that immigration is an ex-

treme and costly decision to reject the socio-political system in which one initially finds oneself. Therefore, individuals who make the immigration decision will orient themselves toward whatever party and behaviors are perceived to be the opposite of those that dominated in their country of origin. If the country of origin was a left-wing repressive totalitarian regime, a reactionary response will lead immigrants to support free-market and libertarian ideologies.

By contrast, the political economic learning hypothesis emphasizes that immigrants are in a special and in many ways privileged position to understand the trade-offs implicit in political and economic choices. In this account, immigrants compare the well-being of themselves and people like them between the different systems. They attribute these differences in well-being to different policy choices about how to organize politics and markets, and this different sense about “what works” and “what doesn’t” is the primary driver of their political behavior.

In the case of immigrants leaving communist countries with poor quality of life, the reactionary and political economic learning hypothesis point in much the same direction. It is nonetheless worth noting that, theoretically, they are competitive and lead to different predictions. For example, the two hypotheses would lead to differing expectations for what the attitudes should be for individuals leaving right-wing authoritarian countries or left-leaning highly developed social democracies. Learning is more consistent with migrants from high-functioning left political economies maintaining left-leaning preferences, while reactionaryism expects them to orient towards the right.

The cultural acquisition hypothesis presumes that political behaviors and preferences arise from more complex and deeper cultural attitudes, for example about the proper relationships between men and women, children and parents, and between individuals of different social castes or creeds. While these cultural values are certainly familial, they are also imposed by the broader political community ([Charnysh and Peisakhin, 2022](#)). Older immigrants acquire cultural values that are more strongly tied to country of origin, while younger arrivals tend to have values inherited from their adopted country. Someone supporting this hypothesis might argue that prevailing gender and racial attitudes in the FSU tended to be patriarchal and anti-black, and these differing cultural attitudes are what

drive differences in behavior between older and younger immigrants in our sample. Presumably, one would expect the age of arrival gradient to tilt in the opposite, more liberal direction for immigrants coming from more egalitarian and socially progressive countries.

A possible variation on the cultural acquisition hypothesis is aspirational integrated dominance. In this account, those immigrants who perceive greater cultural difference between themselves and the culture in which they live respond by aspirationally affiliating with those parties representing socio-economically dominant segments of society. Older arriving immigrants feel less culturally secure than younger immigrants, and so the desire for integration is stronger and influences their decisions about how to affiliate politically. The logic is similar to previous arguments about how perceived social marginalization leads to increased support for right-wing populist parties (Gidron and Hall, 2020). It is, however, importantly different. Feelings of social exclusion for natives are often said to express themselves as anger at historic and ongoing social marginalization, which is perceived as a public wrong as much as a personal one, and also nostalgia for a past where social marginalization for people “like them” did not occur. Immigrants are not able to make inter-generational comparisons within their adopted homeland and are less likely to view social integration in the country of arrival as an entitlement to which they are naturally due. At the same time as they must expect integration into society will require effort, they may have hopes that such effort will be rewarded, in part by making the “winning” choices about how to construct their new social identity. In contrast with native-born individuals perceiving exclusion, they may perceive much greater optimism and agency about their ability to socially integrate through effortful investments.

How aspiring for integration as part of the dominant class works itself out politically likely depends on how the parties and government are organized. For example, the urban political machines of the late 19th century U.S. could legitimately be thought of as “immigrant” party organizations. In contemporary western democracies, however, it is rare to find explicitly immigrant parties, although parties representing social and economic betters are fairly common. Indeed, the Republican Party, with anti-immigrant tendencies, exhibits surprising strength with immigrants plausibly because these immigrants aspire toward social integration within the dominant social strata.

All hypotheses tend to point in the same direction about the bias in partisan affiliation for immigrants from authoritarian communist countries such as the Former Soviet Union, Cuba, and Venezuela. Informally, when pressed to account for their attitudes in qualitative interviews through questions like “so why did you decide to be a Republican”, immigrants in this population often reach for one or more of these explanations. Each hypothesis leads to somewhat different expectations, however, about the political behavior of individuals immigrating from other contexts. These hypotheses are also mostly driven by factors about country of origin, however it is plausible (even likely) that features of the destination country or even the local destination community influence behaviors as well. Future work exploring the causes of immigrant political attitudes should consider at greater length the four hypotheses we offer about why immigrant attitudes and behaviors take the shape that they do.

## 6 Conclusion

Using administrative records from HIAS, a U.S.-based refugee resettlement agency, we study how one’s childhood environment shapes voting patterns and party affiliation later in life. Leveraging one of the largest administrative datasets on immigrants ever assembled, with over 600,000 individual cases, our work focuses on a smaller subsample where a credible research design is possible. In particular, we focus on a subsample of almost 8,000 childhood arrivals who came to the U.S. from 74 different countries between 1938 and 2005 and whom we are able to match to a 2018 voter registration dataset.

Looking at the relationship between age at arrival and voting patterns in the 2014 and 2016 elections, we find that arriving to the U.S. later in life is associated with an increased probability of turning out to vote, especially in less-salient midterm elections. An analysis that compares siblings within the same family confirms this finding: each additional year of childhood spent in the country of origin increases the probability of voting in the 2014 midterm election by 2.3% and of voting in the 2016 presidential election by 0.8%. Measuring the effect of childhood environment on party affiliation with a similar approach, we find that each additional year of childhood spent in the country of origin decreases the

probability of registering as a Democrat in adulthood by 2.2% and increases the probability of registering as a Republican by roughly the same percentage.

Taken together, these results suggest that greater childhood exposure to the (largely) authoritarian and socialist countries of origin led to an increased appreciation for the right to vote and to affiliation with the more conservative party in adulthood. In seeking to understand the mechanisms explaining these differences, we conducted a survey on the client population by posting on Facebook affinity groups for our refugee population. Analysis of these richer qualitative data reveals that younger arriving refugees exhibit typical partisan constraint on orthogonal issue items, while older arriving immigrants do not.

More broadly, we see our work as offering several key contributions to the literature. First, we provide unique evidence about the importance and extent of horizontal transmission dynamics for explaining political attitudes. In contrast with a literature on the role of parental attitudes in shaping children's political attitudes, or a literature that argues political attitudes are significantly innate or perhaps even genetic, we find that *when* in life one immigrates has a large effect on subsequent political participation and attitudes.

Moreover, there is a large literature exploring how childhood experiences shape subsequent political attitudes. From a plausibility standpoint, most of these experiences are not likely to prove as significant as the experience of immigration. Therefore, our work provides guidance on the upper-bound of a plausible childhood environmental effect on political behavior. Finally, a social science literature especially in economics has emphasized critical milestones in childhood development during which treatments are likely to have significant effects on later-life outcomes. We find no such critical point in terms of the formation of political preferences and behaviors. Rather, the length of exposure to the country of origin appears to exert a fairly linear effect on the political attitudes and participation tendencies of the refugees in our sample.

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## Supplemental Information

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### A1 Matching HIAS/AJHS Client Files to L2 Voter File

#### A1.1 Process

Our matching procedure for both the pre-1980 and post-1980 immigrants proceeds in a step-wise fashion. For each of the post-1980 immigrants, we search through the voter files for individuals with active registration that have the same first and last name. If we find a unique match, we accept that match and remove it from the pool of immigrants we are attempting to match. With the new, smaller set of unmatched immigrants, we look for unique exact matches on first and last name, now including inactive registrations as well.<sup>17</sup> Successfully matched names are removed from the pool. With the remaining unmatched immigrants, we again look through the entire voter file for individuals with the same last name, but now allow for one character edit to the first name. Particularly with foreign names, minor transcription errors are fairly common. Any successful unique matches are added to our dataset. At this point, we stop searching for more tenuous matches of the post-1980 cohort. Table A1 shows the number of matches we obtain at each stage. In total, we match 155,421 individuals, a success rate of around 30%.

Table A1: Matching process post 1980.

Stage	Unique	Given Name	Surname	Voters	Clients	Matches
1	✓	Exact	Exact	Only Active	All Post 1980	128,370
2	✓	Exact	Exact	All	Stage 1 Misses	5,620
3	✓	One letter edit	Exact	All	Stage 2 Misses	21,431

Our strategy for finding pre-1980 immigrants proceeds similarly: we search for unique exact matches according to some restrictive set of criteria, remove successful finds from the pool, and then match the leftovers against some less restrictive criteria. We iterate this

<sup>17</sup>If we did not distinguish between active and inactive in this way, then no individual with multiple registrations, some active and others inactive, would end up being included in our sample.

process through more filters than the post-1980 group, because we have more relevant data. In particular, the index cards more or less exactly record birth dates. Individuals are with some frequency recorded as having two names. Sometimes these two names appear to be first and middle, while other times it appears to be a more anglicized alternative (e.g. Dawid vs. David).

In such cases, it is hard to know which given name to search for in the voter file; if an index card describes an immigrant named Ben David, does one expect to find that person registered as Ben, David, or Ben David? Therefore, we consider the possible variations on the name that are contained in the cards. In particular, we apply our iterative procedure for searching for unique exact matches against the following pieces of information: (1) birth date, transcribed given name, transcribed surname; (2) birth year, given name, surname; (3) given name, surname, birthday, birth month, birth year  $\pm 1$  or birth year  $\pm 2$ ; (4) surname, birthdate, plausible variations on the given name; (5) birth year, surname, variations on given; (6) surname, variations on given, birthday, birth month, and birth year  $\pm 1$  or  $\pm 2$ ; (7) birth date, surname, two character edits to the given name, (8) birth date, surname, two character edit to variations on the transcribed given name. Table ?? describes how many matches each step generates. In total, we match 6,140 individuals, a success rate of around 5%. The much lower success rate is not surprising given the median age of a pre-1980 immigrant at present writing is 96.

Table A2: Matching process pre-1980.

Stage	Unique	Given	Surname	Birth Day/Month	Birth Year	Voters	Clients	Matches
1	✓	Exact	Exact	Exact	Exact	All	Pre-1980	2,664
2	✓	Exact	Exact	.	Exact	All	Stage 1 Misses	1,360
3	✓	Exact	Exact	Day and Month	$\leq \pm 2$	All	Stage 2 Misses	127
4	✓	Variations	Exact	Exact	Exact	All	Stage 3 Misses	439
5	✓	Variations	Exact	.	Exact	All	Stage 4 Misses	258
6	✓	Variations	Exact	.	$\leq \pm 2$	All	Stage 5 Misses	36
7	✓	2 Edits to Exact	Exact	Exact	Exact	All	Stage 6 Misses	1,078
8	✓	2 Edits to Variations	Exact	Exact	Exact	All	Stage 7 Misses	178

## A1.2 Representativeness

One important question is whether and how focusing on individuals who match to a voter file differ from those in the larger client population. Table A3 examines how the sample of matched immigrants differs from the sample of unmatched immigrants in the administrative file for the pre-1980 cohort. While similar analysis is desirable for the post-1980 population, we simply lack the necessary information to do this analysis. The table reveals that the interaction of marriage with naming conventions has a substantial impact on the sub-sample. There are fewer women in the matched sample than the administrative file. If an individual was separated at the time of immigration, they are relatively more likely to match. The fact that people known to be married are a smaller part of the

matched sub-sample is initially curious, however it is important to recognize that someone who was already married sometime in the 1955-1980 time frame is likely relatively old by 2018, when we search for them in the voter files. The more likely a person is to be deceased, the less likely they are to appear in the voter file. Indeed, immigrants who are in families with children are relatively more common in the matched sample than in the initial administrative file, which again makes sense given aging dynamics. Finally, it seems that matching against another set of records has induced some selection on administrative data quality. 18% of the individuals in the administrative files have no gender indicated, whereas only 3% of the matched sample are missing gender in the HIAS file.

	Mean (Unmatched)	Mean (Matched)	Difference (Standardized)
Deceased	0.003	0.000	-0.079
Divorced	0.014	0.003	-0.113
Engaged	0.000	0.000	-0.005
Married	0.693	0.411	-0.593
Separated	0.258	0.584	0.701
Widowed	0.032	0.001	-0.240
Unknown Marital Status	0.379	0.390	0.023
Female	0.420	0.311	-0.228
Unknown Gender	0.179	0.032	-0.492
Family Size	3.433	4.118	0.467

Table A3: Sample characteristics of the pre-1980 client population before and after matching

On the one hand, the difference between the matched and unmatched samples may lead to concerns about how representative the families we study are as compared with the typical family assisted by HIAS. We discuss external validity concerns at greater length in the manuscript, but it is worth noting here that the national origin of the typical HIAS immigrant changes drastically over decades, so the representative immigrant family is a strained notion to begin with. Moreover, we find that our results are robust to these drastic changes in national origin of the client population.


On the other hand, the difference observed in the balance table may raise questions about match quality. It is difficult to directly test the proposition, but we do have some indirect tests we can do. For one, the administrative case files describe a small percentage of deceased individuals. Encouragingly, none of our immigrants known to be deceased prior to 1980 appear as active or inactive voters. Another indirect test is that voter files often include gender and so do the HIAS administrative files, but gender is not used in the matching procedure. In greater than 98% of the matched cases, these two genders are concordant. It would be surprising, given the possibility of transcription and intake errors in both files, if the number of matches was 100%.

## A2 How Distinctive Are Soviet Jewish Names?

Our matching approach for post-1980 immigrants relies explicitly upon the assumption that the surnames in this group are distinctive. While this is not necessarily true for all individuals in this client population, it is often true. In presenting our work, we have sometimes been asked how to consider how distinct these last names really are. Figure A1 presents a thought experiment. We can think about how distinctive an registered voter's last name typically is by considering the number of other individuals sharing that name. As the figure shows, the typical voter shares a surname with a few thousand other voters in the United States, it is pretty rare for a voter to share a last name with only a few dozen others, and one in five has a surname such as "Johnson" shared by hundreds of thousands of other voters. If we consider the combination of surname and birth year, the distinctiveness of voters is several orders of magnitude higher. One in five voters will share a surname and birth year with roughly 1,000 other voters, while for the median voter the number of individuals sharing a last name and birth year could fit in a typical classroom. If we think about the combination of birth year, birth month and surname, the median registered voter would share this combination of traits with about 10 people. Only about 5% of registered voters share this trait with 1,000 others or more.

Calculating similar statistics for the last names found post 1980, we see that such surnames have a discriminating power that is close to the power of conditioning on last name, birth year, and birth month in the general population. 70% of these immigrant last names are possessed by 100 registered voters or fewer. This exercise provides some confidence that our matching approach, based additionally on first names and uniqueness constraints, is quite conservative in the sense that our matches are very likely true. At the same time, these statistics may give some indication why relaxing the uniqueness, first or last name constraints give us pause.

Figure A1: Distinctiveness of Surnames in Sample v. Registered Voters .



# A3 Survey Sample Descriptive Statistics

Figure A2: Respondent Birth Country




Figure A3: Respondent Year of Immigration






Figure A4: Respondent Reason for Immigration




Figure A5: Respondent Age




Figure A6: Respondent Age at Time of Immigration




Figure A7: Respondent Education Level





Figure A8: Respondent Household Income



## A4 Survey Materials

The groups targeted for posting as well as the time of posting and a link to the post are included in the table below.

Posting Time	Group	Post Link
08/06/21 8:16 PM PST	Russian Speaking Immigrants in America	<a href="#">Link</a>
08/13/21 10:52 AM PST	Israeli Russian Jews Bay Area	<a href="#">Link</a>
08/18/21 10:36 AM PST	Russian Jews NY	<a href="#">Link</a>
08/18/21 10:38 AM PST	Soviet Jewry Struggle	<a href="#">Link</a>
08/18/21 10:40 AM PST	Official Russian Jews	<a href="#">Link</a>
08/18/21 10:45 AM PST	Stateless-Documentary	<a href="#">Link</a>
08/18/21 10:46 AM PST	My past in Ladispoli, Rome	<a href="#">Link</a>

# A5 Survey Instrument

## HIAS Survey

Start of Block: Consent Form

Consent The purpose of this study is to improve our understanding of immigration and the process of assimilating into a new country. If you decide to take part in this study, you will be asked to complete a survey. You will be asked questions about your background and political views. This survey should take you approximately 25 minutes to complete. About 5,000 participants will take part in this study. The risks of participation are minimal. We will not ask you to provide identifying information about yourself such as your email address or physical address. Your individual responses cannot be traced back to you. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You are free not to participate or to withdraw at any time, for any reason. By clicking the arrow at the bottom of the screen, you are providing your consent to participate in this study. **For optimal viewing, please complete this survey on a computer (rather than a phone or a tablet).**

End of Block: Consent Form

Start of Block: Baseline Demographics

Age In what year were you born?

▼ 2002 (1) ... 1900 (103)



Gender What is your gender?

- Male (1)
- Female (2)
- Other/Nonbinary (3)

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Education What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- I did not graduate high school (1)
- I graduated from high school or got my GED (2)
- I attended college for one or more years but did not graduate (3)
- I graduated from a 2-year college (4)
- I graduated from a 4-year college or university (5)
- I have a graduate or professional degree (6)

EdYrsUS How many years of education did you complete in the United States?

▼ 1 (1) ... More than 22 years (23)

Job Which of the following best describes your current employment status?

- Employed full time (1)
- Employed part time (2)
- Temporarily laid off (3)
- Unemployed not looking for work (4)
- Retired (5)
- Student (6)
- Disabled (7)
- Homemaker (8)
- Other (9)

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Race Which racial or ethnic group best describes you? (You may select more than one)

- White (1)
- Black or African American (2)
- American Indian or Alaska Native (3)
- Asian (4)
- Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (5)
- Middle Eastern (6)
- Hispanic or Latino (7)
- Other (8)

State What state or territory do you live in now?

▼ Alabama (1) ... I do not reside in the United States (53)

Zip Please enter your current zip code. (This survey is still anonymous. Providing your zip code does not give us enough information to identify you individually).

\_\_\_\_\_

Page 2 of 32

Income Which of the following is closest to your annual household income?

- Under \$25,000 (1)
- \$25,000 to \$50,000 (2)
- \$50,001 to \$75,000 (3)
- \$75,001 to \$100,000 (4)
- \$100,001 to \$150,000 (5)
- Over \$150,000 (6)

savings About how much of your monthly income do you put away as savings?

- 0 (1)
- 1-5% (2)
- 5-10% (3)
- 10-20% (4)
- More than 20% (5)
- I do not earn an income (6)
- I don't know (7)

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Married What is your marital status?

- Married (1)
- Widowed (2)
- Divorced (3)
- Separated (4)
- Never married (5)
- Domestic / civil partnership (6)

Children Do you have children?

- Yes (5)
- No (6)

Display This Question:  
If Do you have children? = Yes

ChildInfo Please tell us the following information about each of your children.

Please note that we are asking for first names *only*. These cannot be used to identify or locate your family members, and none of your answers to this survey will be shared with anyone.

Here is an example for how you might fill out the table. If you had a daughter named Anna who was 30 years old, who was not born in the United States, and came to the United States when she was 15 years old, you would fill out the table below like this:

Years, enter number)	First Name	Current Age (in	
Age When You Moved to the	Born in the United States? Y/N	Years, enter	Child's
United States? (in Years, enter number)		number) (2)	Age
			When You
			Moved to the
			United States?
			(in Years, enter
			number) (4)
30	N	15	Anna

If Anna was your only child, you would leave rows 2-15 below blank in the table. If you had

another child, you would fill out information for child in the row for "Child 2," leave rows 3-15 blank, and so on.

	First Name (1)	Current Age (in Years, enter number) (2)	Born in the United States? Y/N (3)	Child's Age When You Moved to the United States? (in Years, enter number) (4)
Child 1 (1)				
Child 2 (2)				
Child 3 (3)				
Child 4 (4)				
Child 5 (5)				
Child 6 (6)				
Child 7 (7)				
Child 8 (8)				

Child 9 (9)				
Child 10 (10)				
Child 11 (11)				
Child 12 (12)				
Child 13 (13)				
Child 14 (14)				
Child 15 (15)				

Religion What is your religion, if any?

- Protestant (1)
- Roman Catholic (2)
- Mormon (3)
- Eastern or Greek Orthodox (4)
- Jewish (5)
- Muslim (6)
- Buddhist (7)
- Hindu (8)
- Jehova's Witness (15)
- Atheist (16)
- Agnostic (17)
- Nothing in particular (18)
- Something else (19) \_\_\_\_\_

Church Are you a member of a synagogue, church, mosque, temple, or some other type of religious congregation?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

CongregationDemo About how many members of your congregation would you say are also immigrants from your home country or immigrants who speak your native language?

- Almost none (1)
- A few (2)
- Quite a few, but not a majority (3)
- A majority (4)
- Almost all (5)
- Don't know (6)

ReligiousServices Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?

- More than once a week (1)
- Once a week (2)
- Once or twice a month (3)
- A few times a year (4)
- Rarely (5)
- Never (6)

ReligionHomeCountry Are you more religious today than you were when you lived in your home country?

- More religious (1)
- About the same (2)
- Less religious (5)

Display This Question:

If What is your religion, if any? = Jewish

USJews How much in common would you say that Jewish immigrants from your home country or nearby countries have with American-born Jews?

- Very little (1)
- Some (2)
- A fair amount (3)
- A great deal (4)

End of Block: Baseline Demographics

Start of Block: Immigration

ImmTransition We'll start by asking you for some basic information about yourself and your immigration experience.

X

BirthCountry What country were you born in? (Please note: if the country you were born in no longer exists in its original form, please select the present-day country that contains the city, town, or area you were born in).

▼ Afghanistan (1) ... Zimbabwe (1357)

ImmStat Which of the following statements best describes you?

- I am an immigrant to the United States and a naturalized citizen (1)
- I am an immigrant to the United States, but not a citizen of the United States (2)
- I was born in the United States, but at least one of my parents is an immigrant (3)
- My parents and I were born in the United States, but at least one of my grandparents was an immigrant (4)
- My parents, grandparents, and I were all born in the United States (5)
- I am in the United States temporarily for work, education, or personal reasons (6)

ImmYear In what year did you move to the United States?

▼ 2020 (1) ... 1920 (101)

AgeImm How old were you when you moved to the United States?

▼ 0 (1) ... 100 (101)

ImmOrg Did the Hebrew Immigration Aid Society, or HIAS, help you or your family emigrate to the United States?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)
- I don't know (12)

Sponsor Did a friend, family member, or someone else officially sponsor you when you immigrated to the United States?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)
- I don't know (3)

AssignmentState When you first arrived in the United States, what state did you move to?

▼ Alabama (1) ... I do not reside in the United States (53)

AssignmentCity When you first arrived in the United States, what city did you move to?

AssignmentReason Did you live in this location when you first moved to the United States because the Hebrew Immigration Aid Society (HIAS) recommended that you go there?

- Yes (1)
- No (9)



ImmWhy Which of the following represents the **most important reason** you or your family decided to move to the United States?

- Economic opportunity (1)
- Religious or ethnic persecution (2)
- War (3)
- Political instability (4)
- Environmental disaster (7)
- Educational opportunity (8)
- Something else, please describe: (9)  
\_\_\_\_\_

Waiting Country Did you spend time in a country outside of your home country while you waited to emigrate to the United States?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)
- I don't know (4)

Display This Question:

If Did you spend time in a country outside of your home country while you waited to emigrate to the... = Yes

WaitingCountryID If so, where did you live while you waited to emigrate to the United States?

- Austria (1)
- Israel (2)
- Italy (3)
- Somewhere else (4)  
\_\_\_\_\_

ImmigAssets Did you move to the United States with financial assets or savings that helped you start your life in this country?

- Yes (4)
- No (5)

Discrimination Did you personally experience discrimination in your home country before you moved to the United States?

- Yes, I was discriminated against by regular citizens living in my home country. (1)
- Yes, I was discriminated against by the government of my home country. (2)
- Yes, I was discriminated against by an organization or group that was prominent in my home country (3)
- No, I never experienced discrimination in my home country. (4)

Visa What category of visa were you granted when you immigrated to the United States?

- Family Reunification: I had family members in the United States. (1)
- Employment: My employer sponsored my visa for entry into the United States (2)
- Government Employee: I worked for the United States in another country (3)
- Diversity: I applied under the visa diversity program (4)
- Refugee: I applied to enter the United States as a refugee (5)
- Other (7)
- I did not receive a visa (8)

EduHome How many years of education did you receive in your home country?

▼ 0 (1) ... More than 22 years (28)

NativeLang What is your native language?

- English (1)
- Belarusian (2)
- Czech (3)
- Estonian (4)
- Hungarian (5)
- Latvian (6)
- Lithuanian (7)
- Polish (8)
- Romanian (9)
- Russian (10)
- Slovak (11)
- Ukrainian (12)
- Yiddish (14)
- Another language. Please enter: (15)  
\_\_\_\_\_

NativeLangSkill Can you still speak, read, and write in **your native language**?

	Yes (1)	No (2)
I can speak in my native language (7)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I can read in my native language (8)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I can write in my native language (9)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

LangAtHome What language(s) do you speak at home?

- Exclusively my native language (1)
- Mostly my native language, but some English (2)
- My native language about half the time, and English the other half of the time (3)
- Mostly English, but sometimes my native language (4)
- I speak a language at home that is not English or my native language (5)



NativeLangMedia Do you read newspapers, listen to the radio, watch television, or consume other forms of media in your native language?

- Yes (6)
- No (7)



NativeLangTV Do you pay for a subscription that lets you watch television channels in your native language?

- Yes (4)
- No (5)

English Did you learn to speak English before you moved to the United States?

- Yes (4)
- No (5)

EnglishAbility How confident are you in your ability to use English in daily life?

- Confident. I can read and write in English fluently and I speak without an accent. (1)
- Fairly Confident. I can read, write, and speak in English fluently, but I speak with an accent. (2)
- Somewhat Confident. I can read and write English but I need help speaking and understanding English. (3)
- Somewhat Confident. I can speak and understand English but I need help reading and writing in English. (4)
- Not Very Confident. I need help speaking, reading, and writing English. (5)

ImmSocial How many of your friends are also immigrants from your home country to the United States?

- None or almost none (1)
- A few (2)
- About half (3)
- A majority (4)
- All or almost all (5)

End of Block: Immigration

Start of Block: Participation

PtxPreamble The next few questions focus on your political attitudes and participation in politics. Please answer to the best of your ability.

**Please note: whether or not you vote is a matter of public record and can be verified.**

Ideo5

In general, would you describe yourself as...?

- Very liberal (29)
- Liberal (30)
- Moderate (31)
- Conservative (32)
- Very conservative (33)



pid3 Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?

- Republican (1)
- Democrat (2)
- Independent (3)
- Other (4) \_\_\_\_\_

follownews Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs...

- Most of the time (48)
- Some of the time (49)
- Only now and then (50)
- Hardly at all (51)
- I don't know (52)



donated Have you ever donated money to a political candidate?

- Yes (18)
- No (19)



donatedissue Have you ever donated money to a political organization, activist group, or issue campaign?

- Yes (5)
- No (6)



campaignwork Have you ever volunteered or worked for a political candidate?

- Yes (4)
- No (5)



contact Have you ever contacted an elected official with a concern or a request?

- Yes (4)
- No (5)



voted2016 Did you vote in the 2016 presidential election?

- Yes (4)
- No (5)

votechoice2016 In the 2016 election for United States President, who did you vote for?

- Donald Trump (1)
- Hillary Clinton (2)
- Gary Johnson (3)
- Jill Stein (4)
- Someone Else (please fill in): (5)



registered Are you currently registered to vote?

- Yes (5)
- No (6)



votechoice2020 In the 2020 election for United States President, who did you vote for?

- Joe Biden (1)
- Donald Trump (2)
- Jo Jorgensen (3)
- Howie Hawkins (4)
- Someone Else (please fill in): (5)
- I did not vote in the 2020 presidential election (6)

organizations Do you currently belong to any social, political, or economic organizations whose membership consists primarily of immigrants from your home country? If yes, select all that apply.

- Business organizations (192)
- Church groups (193)
- Community organizations (194)
- Fraternities (195)
- Professional organizations (196)
- Social organizations (197)
- Volunteer groups (198)
- Other, please specify (199)
- None (200)

polcomm When you were growing up, how often did you and your family discuss politics at home?

- Almost never (1)
- Sometimes (2)
- A fair amount (3)
- All the time (4)

polorigin1 If you participate in politics, what made you decide to do it?

- I decided to get involved on my own (14)
- A political party advertised or reached out to me (15)
- A friend encouraged me to get involved (16)
- A family member encouraged me to get involved (17)
- A coworker encouraged me to get involved (18)
- Someone in my religious congregation encouraged me to get involved (19)
- A classmate or fellow student encouraged me to get involved (20)
- An activist or local organizer encouraged me to get involved (21)
- Something else, please describe (22)
- I do not participate in politics (23)



PartyHouse Which political party has a majority of seats in the United States House of Representatives?

- Republicans (1)
- Democrats (2)
- Neither (3)
- Not Sure (5)



PartySenate Which political party has a majority of seats in the United States Senate?

- Republicans (1)
- Democrats (2)
- Neither (3)
- Not Sure (4)



SenatPartyRecall Which political parties do the two United States senators from **your state** represent?

- Both Democrats (1)
- Both Republicans (2)
- One Democrat, one Republican (3)
- Both Independents (4)
- One Independent, one Republican (5)
- One Independent, one Democrat (6)
- Not Sure (7)



QuestionID Please identify the person in this photo.

- Paul Ryan (1)
- Lindsay Graham (2)
- John Boehner (3)
- Colin Powell (4)
- Not Sure (5)

End of Block: Participation

Start of Block: Racial Resentment

RRDescription Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.

RRBootstraps Irish people, Italians, Jewish people, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.

- Strongly agree (8)
- Somewhat agree (9)
- Neither agree nor disagree (10)
- Somewhat disagree (11)
- Strongly disagree (12)

RRslavery Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Somewhat agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Somewhat disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

RRdeserve Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.

- Strongly agree (8)
- Somewhat agree (9)
- Neither agree nor disagree (10)
- Somewhat disagree (11)
- Strongly disagree (12)

RRtryhard It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough. If blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.

- Strongly agree (8)
- Somewhat agree (9)
- Neither agree nor disagree (10)
- Somewhat disagree (11)
- Strongly disagree (12)

RRprivilege White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.

- Strongly agree (8)
- Somewhat agree (9)
- Neither agree nor disagree (10)
- Somewhat disagree (11)
- Strongly disagree (12)

RRracismrare Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations.

- Strongly agree (8)
- Somewhat agree (9)
- Neither agree nor disagree (10)
- Somewhat disagree (11)
- Strongly disagree (12)

End of Block: Racial Resentment

Start of Block: Policy Views

MarketPreamble Now we are going to ask you some questions about government and the economy. There are no incorrect answers. Please choose the answers that come closest to your views.

EconomicOutlook A year from now, are economic conditions likely to be better, worse, or about the same as they are now?

- Better (1)
- Worse (2)
- About the same (3)



SpendonPoor Should federal spending to help poor people be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?

- Increased (1)
- Decreased (2)
- Kept About the Same (6)

Corporations People can trust corporations to do business in a safe and fair way without government intervention.

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Somewhat Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree Nor Disagree (3)
- Somewhat Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

InequalityTooMuch There is too much economic inequality in the country these days.

- Strongly Disagree (1)
- Somewhat Disagree (2)
- Neither Agree Nor Disagree (3)
- Somewhat Agree (4)
- Strongly Agree (5)

InequalityWhy Which of the following do you think might be the most important reasons why there is income inequality in the United States?

- The different life choices people make (1)
- Some people work harder than others (2)
- The growing number of illegal immigrants working in the United States (3)
- Discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities (4)
- Not enough regulation of major corporations (5)
- The tax system (6)
- Problems with the educational system (7)
- Something else (please fill in): (8) \_\_\_\_\_

Guns Should gun laws be more strict, less strict, or about the same as they are today?

- More strict (1)
- About the same as they are today (2)
- Less strict (3)

Abortion Should abortion be legal in all cases, legal in only some cases, or illegal in all cases?

- Legal in all cases (1)
- Legal in only some cases (2)
- Illegal in all cases (3)

Immigration Should the government make immigration to the United States easier, more difficult, or keep it about the same?

- Easier (1)
- More Difficult (2)
- About the same (3)

ImmigrationWhy Why do you think immigration to the United States should be more difficult than it is today?

\_\_\_\_\_

Israel1 Thinking about U.S. interests, how important of an issue is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

- The single most important issue for the U.S. (1)
- Among the top five issues (2)
- Important, but not among the top five issues (3)
- Not important at all (4)

Israel2 Do you support the executive order to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem?

- Strongly support (1)
- Support (2)
- Neither support nor oppose (3)
- Oppose (4)
- Strongly oppose (5)

Israel3 Do you think U.S. military aid to Israel should be increased, kept the same, decreased, or stopped altogether?

- Increased (1)
- Kept the same (2)
- Decreased (3)
- Stopped (4)